

КОНФЕРЕНЦИЯ

«СТЫКИ МОДЕРНОСТИ: ПОСТСОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКИЕ ИНСТИТУТЫ, СУБЪЕКТИВНОСТИ И ДИСКУРСЫ В СРАВНИТЕЛЬНОЙ ПЕРСПЕКТИВЕ»

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THE EUROPEAN UNION IN CENTRAL ASIA: A NEW CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE?

From the 1990s onwards, Central Asia has been the target of numerous projects and initiatives on behalf of Western states and international institutions. Most of the initiatives of Western donors were focused on the strengthening of civil society by using an instrumental approach. In their action, international donors were misled by their own experience and interpretation of Western civil society. In so doing, they overlooked two very important aspects: firstly, modern Western society took two centuries to evolve; secondly, they were operating in a different social, economic, political and cultural context. Since 2006, a new concept of democracy assistance was implemented by Western donors; a pivotal role was assigned to 'community development' on the grassroots level. The paper examines the ways in which, through its new forms of engagement in Central Asia, the EU is trying to overcome the pitfalls and limitations of the Western-oriented approach in the region, promoting the creation of a genuine and effective civil society.

Key words: EU, Central Asia, democracy assistance.

1. Introduction: the Western-centric theoretical framework in the "Post-soviet social"

As pointed out by Youngs, the third wave of democratization taking place between 1974 and 1990 leads to a "teleological optimism in democracy's propensity to inexorable expansion" [15, 1]. Western culture grounded in citizenship, statehood, education, individual rights was seen as characterized by a mutually reinforcing and expansive nature. Western "norms and institutions were taken for granted in contemporary life" and "no source of instability, conflict, or opposition to the progressive expansion of [Western] world culture" was foreseen [11, 343].

From the 1990s onwards, Western countries translated this teleological and Western-centric view of political development into democracy assistance programs and strategies based on certain “self-confidence about one’s own systemic superiority” [2, 9].

One of the main strategies in the development agenda was the promotion and strengthening of civil society conceived as a “realm of organized intermediary groups that are voluntary, self-generating, independent from the state and the family and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” able to build “pressure for democratic transition and pushing it through its completion” [5, XXX]. In particular, international donors leaned towards a neo-liberal version of civil society made up by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other private and non-profit organizations able to oppose the state and to foster economic reforms and liberalism of social service provisions. This form of neo-liberal civil society had briefly emerged also in soviet context between the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s and was represented by the dissident movements and their social and political engagement against the soviet system (see for example, the Velvet Revolution).

In the course of the 1990s, Western countries invested millions of dollars in the development of civil society in Central Asia through the creation and financing of several Western-style NGOs, considered as the building blocks of civil society itself.

Altogether, two major problems emerged from the democracy assistance strategy implemented: firstly, a problem of sustainability of these groups which tend to disappear once the financial aid has expired; secondly, a tendency of the financed NGOs to be more connected with the international community than with the domestic one. In particular, these organizations were focused on problems and activities able to attract international visibility and consensus instead of addressing issues which could have had an impact on the local and national community. In this way, they became increasingly disengaged from national politics and were not effective in the creation of a civil dialogue with the local population, authorities and central government [14, 157–161]. As a result, the strategy was neither successful in the spread of a new democratic political culture nor able to affect the policy-making process.

The main weakness of this Western-based approach was its overlooking of the social, economic and cultural complexity of Central Asia where “several values and norms exist parallel to one another as the Soviet heritage, regionalism, clientelism and tribal affiliation” [2, 12] as well as of the importance of “the cultural dimension of authority and [of] the political community structures” [12, 25]. Indeed, in their action, international donors used Western civil society as a model, as a “ready-made, compulsory blueprint for reform to be implemented in ‘oriental’ society, in the span of one generation” [13, 1005] ignoring that Western civil society has taken more than two hundred years to evolve in its current form and that Central Asia still lacks the democratic culture which could allow such a civil society model to thrive. At the same time, international donors failed to consider another more indigenous version of civil society which has existed in the region since pre-soviet time and is based on traditions of reciprocal helping and local processes of decision

making. This more communal form of civil society is described by Babajanian, Freizer and Stevens as “a sphere of social interaction where people come together on a voluntary basis along interest lines, to exchange information, deliberate about collective action, and define public opinion” [1, 213], able to sustain community organizing, stability and solidarity¹.

Aware of the pitfalls and limitations coming from the previous democracy promotion strategies, since the late 1990s Western donors have been engaged in a renewed effort focused on “community development” through a participatory approach involving local actors. A particular attention has been given to the local context, institutions and structures, where these initiatives are carried out. This applies also for the European Union which, since 2007, has implemented a new concept of democracy promotion especially through the thematic program “Non-state actors and Local Authorities in Development” and the “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights” (EIDHR), assigning a pivotal role to “community development” initiatives on the grassroots level.

The paper aims at a descriptive analysis of the main official documents underpinning the new EU strategy in the field of democracy promotion in Central Asia. The sample of documents includes the “Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide” (2006) [10], the “Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–2013” (2007) [9], the “Joint Progress Report by the Council and the European Commission to the European Council on the implementation of the EU-Central Asia Strategy” (2008) [7], “The European Union and Central Asia: the New partnership in Action” (2009), the “Thematic Program Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in development. 2011–2013 Strategy Paper” (2012) [8].

Three main issues have been identified that lead to a logical progression through the analysis. Firstly, I will investigate the foundation of EU engagement in the field of democracy and the principles guiding its action. In particular, I will address the question whether the EU strategy is still “characterized by certain self-confidence about its own systemic superiority”. Secondly, I will explore the ways in which democracy is defined and how civil society is conceptualized; in particular, I will focus on the relationship existing between democracy and civil society according to the selected documents. Finally, I will look at the ways in which the national and local contexts are taken into consideration in the new EU development agenda and at how community development and participatory approach are conceived.

2. The EU Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia

In 2007, the European Community has introduced a *Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia*. A total of 750 million EUR was assigned to the region for the period 2007–2013 under the Development Cooperation Instrument

¹ See, for instance, the practice of *ashar*, defined by Earle as “a pre-Soviet form of collective voluntary work, in which groups of people were mobilized to provide assistance of family and neighbors” [6, 251].

(DCI) for initiatives both at bilateral and at regional level. Noteworthy, the EU's bilateral relations are built upon Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) which are based on three pillars: political dialogue, trade and economic relations and cooperation in a variety of sectors. As stated in the *European Community Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–2013*, these three pillar are grounded in “common values of respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law and include commitments to align their respective legal frameworks with that of the EU” [9, 3].

The Strategy testifies to a renewed interest of the European Union in the region which can be explained as follows. Due to the EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007, the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus into the European Neighborhood Policy and the Black Sea Synergy Initiative, Central Asia and the EU became closer geographically, politically and economically. The peculiar geographical location of these states with respect to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran has made of Central Asia a very “delicate” spot where security concerns apply. Therefore, cooperation in the field of border management, migration, fight against organized crime and international terrorism as well as human, drugs, and arms trafficking was seen as necessary not just for CA but also for the European Union and its security. At the same time, as reported in the *Strategy for a New Partnership*, the “EU dependency on external energy sources and the need for diversified energy supply policy in order to increase energy security open[ed] further perspective for cooperation” with this region whose countries are particularly rich in natural resources [7, 10].

3. EU Democracy Assistance and the new legal framework

In the *Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–2013*, democratic development and good governance represent key issues together with the promotion of prosperity, solidarity, human rights, decent work, security and sustainable development [9, 4]. Three main fields are identified in this regard: 1) civil society and democratic process; 2) the judicial sphere; 3) Good Governance and Public Service.

Firstly, with regard to civil society and democratic process, the EU assistance “will focus on strengthening democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. This also covers support for democratic institutions and fostering the development of civil society and media”. Secondly, according to the document the judicial field needs to be reformed assuring greater independence and efficiency in line with international standards with special attention to the improvement of the rule of law. Thirdly, the *Regional Strategy Paper* states that Good Governance and Public Service reform should be fostered in order to increase governance and effectiveness of public administration, to reduce corruption and enhance the rule of law as well as to improve transparency and rationalization of public budget management [Ibid, 31].

Interestingly, the document highlights that the priorities set out by Central Asian governments regarding improvement of people's well-being, poverty alleviation

and the fight against terrorism mirror the three priority areas addressed in the *Strategy Paper*. This is interpreted as evidence that “the transition process is using the EU model, as well as OSCE and UN standards, as an essential point of reference” [9, 8].

In the *Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia*, democracy is associated with human rights, rule of law, good governance, which all together are seen as essential elements underpinning long-term political stability and economic development in Central Asia. As reported in this regard, “the development of a stable political framework and of functioning economic structures are dependent on respect for the rule of law, human rights, good governance and the development of transparent, democratic political structures” [4, 15].

No section is explicitly dedicated to democracy in the *Strategy*. However, a role of pivotal importance is attributed to human rights and rule of law: in the document, the EU engagement is described as “Support for protection” and “Promotion” of human rights and rule of law and the European Union’s involvement in this field is defined as a “sustainable contribution” [Ibid]. The initiatives should be based on an open, constructive, structured, regular, results-oriented dialogue [Ibid, 15–16], “taking into account the policy agenda of the individual Central Asian countries and their distinct political and social realities” [Ibid, 31]. However, the document is quite vague when it affirms that “the forms and modalities of such dialogue will be defined individually and at a future stage” [Ibid, 16] without mentioning how this will take place and which actors will be involved.

A reference to civil society is made, when the document affirms that “the task of sustaining a culture of human rights and making democracy work for its citizens calls for the active involvement of civil society. A developed and active civil society and independent media are vital for the development of a pluralistic society. The EU will cooperate with the Central Asia states to this end and promote enhanced exchanges in civil society” [Ibid, 17].

In the *Joint Progress Report by the Council and the European Commission to the European Council on the implementation of the EU-Central Asia Strategy* of 2008, a reference to the new approach used by the European Union in Central Asia is made. The approach is described as “unprecedented”, based on “concrete actions” which “have been mutually agreed upon and are being implemented or are under preparation, both bilaterally with the five Central Asian republics, and with all on key regional issues” [7, 2]. A smooth implementation on the ground of the *Strategy* is encouraged [Ibid, 3].

In the document, democracy is not discussed *per se* but always associated with human rights, rule of law, and good governance. The *Joint Progress Report* points out that “All Central Asian states agreed to engage in or continue a structured Human Rights Dialogue with the EU” [Ibid, 2]; with regard to rule of law and legal and judiciary reforms, it suggests a sharing of experience between the EU and Central Asia [Ibid, 6].

The *Joint Progress Report* ends with an invitation toward more cooperation between EU, civil society, government and local actors and authorities: in particular, “a greater effort should be made to promote human rights and democratization and

to ensure active involvement of civil society, Parliament, local authorities and other actors in the monitoring and implementation of the Strategy” [7, 14]. Noteworthy, neither the actors — civil society, local authorities, other actors — are explicitly identified nor the forms of their involvement are concretely indicated.

A completely different approach characterizes the *European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights* which is cited in the *Strategy* as an additional way to contribute to human rights dialogue through financial and technical cooperation and specific projects at national level.

The *Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide* explicitly clarifies the mutual relationship and interdependency existing between human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance. Democracy and human rights are seen as “inextricably linked”: in particular, “the fundamental freedoms of expression and association are the preconditions of political pluralism and democratic process, whereas democratic control and separation of powers are essential to sustain an independent judiciary and the rule of law which in turn are required for effective protection of human rights”. In the Point 22 of the Introduction of the Regulation, a reference to democratization and, more specifically, to democratic processes is made with regard to the “European Election Observation Missions” and their significant and successful contribution. Notwithstanding, it is also mentioned that “the promotion of democracy extends far beyond the electoral process alone”.

The *Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006* provides also a justification for the Community’s engagement in the field of democracy and human rights. As mentioned in Point 2 of the Introduction, “Articles 6 (1) of the Treaty on European Union stipulated that the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States”. The promotion, development and consolidation of these values represent a core objective of the Community’s development policy and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries. At the same time, the *Regulation* refers to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other human rights instruments established by the United Nations as ground in which EU’s contribution in the field of democracy, human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms is rooted.

Whereas the *Strategy* describes the initiatives implemented as the result of a decision made in partnership and cooperation with Central Asian countries, the *Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006* establishes and allows forms of assistance which are independent from the consent of third country government and other public authorities. This independency of action is stressed several times throughout the document, where these measures are depicted as “in addition” and “complementary” to the measures agreed with partner countries, able to address “community needs” which were unforeseeable or simply caused by exceptional circumstances.

The choice of this approach relates also to the content of the action itself. Indeed, as Point 9 of the Introduction of the Regulation states, “the task of building and sustaining a culture of human rights and making democracy work for citizens,

though especially urgent and difficult in emerging democracies, is essentially a continuous challenge, belonging first and foremost to the people of the country". In this view, significant steps toward democratization may be accomplished through a partnership with civil society defined as "all types of social action by individuals or groups that are independent from the state".

Therefore, civil society is addressed as a central actor in the promotion and consolidation of democracy and democratic reform of third countries and identified as the main target of the initiatives under EIDHR together with public sector non-profit agencies, institutions and organizations and networks at local, national, regional and international level, national, regional and international parliamentary bodies, international and regional intergovernmental organizations and natural persons (see Article 10).

Noteworthy, the *Regulation* foresees regular monitors and reviews of the initiatives in order to evaluate the effectiveness, coherence and consistence of the programs also by means of independent external evaluators and through annual and review reports.

A strong focus on civil society characterizes also the *Thematic Program "Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in Development"* of 2006, which follows an "actor-oriented" approach, complementing the *Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights* which uses a "sector-oriented" approach.

The *Non-State Actors and Local Authorities Program* focuses on supporting stakeholders — identified with non-state actors and local authorities — by providing financial resources for their "own initiatives" with the aim of involving all part of society in the development process and encouraging their participation in the political, social and economic dialogue.

The "building of the capacity of NSAs and LAs with a view to strengthening their role in poverty reduction and sustainable development strategies" together with the fostering of a "greater interaction between state and non-state actors in various contexts, including NSA involvement in a policy dialogue with the government and their capacity to play an oversight role" represent some of the main objectives of this program [8, 16].

In order to enhance the credibility, visibility and influence of stakeholders, the *Program* recommends the creation of civil society networks and the coordination of their activities with the EU institutions as a way to foster synergies and ensure a structured dialogue. This initiative addresses especially disadvantaged groups in developing countries and, according to the document, NGOs are in the best position to reach and give voice to them. NGOs are therefore recognized a specific, irreplaceable, and essential role in promoting human rights and grassroots democratization.

4. Conclusion

From the very brief analysis presented in the last paragraph, three broad conclusions on the new European Union Democracy Assistance Strategy in Central Asia can be drawn.

Firstly, the European Union lacks of a precise definition of what “democracy” means. The democratic process is associated to regular and fair elections but the promotion of democracy is considered to extend far beyond the electoral process.

In the documents taken into consideration, democracy tends to be associated with human rights, good governance, and rule of law but is never really discussed alone. The *Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006* conceptualizes democracy and human rights as “inextricably linked”. Besides references to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights upon which all Central Asian states have agreed, an auto-referential justification is presented for the EU’s commitment in the field of democracy and human rights. Indeed, as *Regulation* reports, the promotion of principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedom, and the rule of law represents a core objective of the Community’s development policy and economic, financial and technical cooperation with third countries since these values constitute the *culture* on which the European Union itself is funded. Here, the idea of the European Union as “Civilizing Power” and as a normative actor, focused on the promotion of its own Euro-centric model emerges.

However, this position is mitigated by the use of a very “smooth” approach based on “cooperation”, “partnership” in agreement with Central Asian countries, “support for protection” and “promotion” of democracy and human rights. Similarly, the *Joint Progress Report* presents the European Union’s Rule of Law Initiative for Central Asia as based on a sharing of experience between EU and CA.

Secondly, the new EU Democracy Assistance Strategy is characterized by *inclusivity*². Indeed, as the *Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia* highlights, the content of the programs should be defined and agreed with the authorities and tailored to the specific needs of each country. Once again, not “imposition from above” but rather “cooperation” and “partnership” with Central Asian governments is chosen.

In addition, the *European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights* and the *Thematic Program “Non State Actors and Local Authorities in Development”* promote a participatory and actor-oriented approach, aiming at involving and supporting local actors and authorities in the implementation of “their own initiatives” on the ground. Through these initiatives, the European Union seeks to increase and diversify civil society in Central Asia, involving different actors in the political, social and economic dialogue and decision-making process, fostering both liberal and communal forms of civil society. Nonetheless, important questions regarding who can really have access to EU financing aids and who is capable and has the means and expertise to deal with the very complex bureaucratic procedures necessary for a successful grant application are not appropriately addressed.

Thirdly, the new EU Democracy Assistance Strategy is characterized by *reflexivity*³. Indeed, the regular completion of monitor and review papers, the

² Inclusivity refers here to the “extend to which EU foreign policy-makers permit a role (in theory or in practice) in European Foreign policy-making for external actors affected by EFP” [3, 288].

³ Reflexivity refers here to the “capacity of EU foreign policy-makers to critically analyse the EU’s policy and adapt it according to the effect that the policy is expected to have on the targeted area” [4, 289].

employment of independent external observers evaluating the effectiveness, coherence and consistence of the programs as well as the implementation of *ad hoc* initiatives looking at the countries' specificities, unforeseeable and exceptional needs can all be interpreted as an evidence of a new more attentive approach which take into consideration the local socio-political context.

The new democracy promotion strategy represents a first faint attempt of the European Union to go beyond the teleological Western-oriented approach to democracy. Only in the next years it will be clear whether this new theoretical framework based on an actor-oriented perspective and focused on the local and domestic context will be able to promote *genuine* democratization at the grassroots level, fostering new synergies between civil society, local actors and authorities and the government.

Acronyms

CA	Central Asia
EIDHR	European Instrument for democracy and Human Rights
EU	European Union
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
UN	United Nations
USAID	US Agency for International Development

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К. Пиеробон

ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СОЮЗ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ: НОВОЕ ПОНИМАНИЕ ПОДДЕРЖКИ ДЕМОКРАТИИ

С 90-х гг. Центральная Азия была объектом многочисленных инициатив западных государств и международных организаций, большинство из которых было направлено на усиление гражданского общества как инструмента демократизации. Международные доноры, прилагая усилия по развитию демократии в Центральной Азии, не учли, что гражданское общество в Европе имело длительную историю развития и что Центральная Азия является иной экономической, политической и культурной средой. С 2000-х гг. складывается новое понимание поддержки демократии, построенное на понятии «поддержка сообществ» на низовом уровне. Автор рассматривает, каким образом ЕС посредством новых проектов в странах Центральной Азии преодолевал провалы и ограничения европоцентричного подхода к региону.

Ключевые слова: Евросоюз, Центральная Азия, поддержка демократии.

Третья волна демократизации — с 1974 по 1990 г. — породила телеологический оптимизм относительно способности демократии к распространению. Западная культура, укорененная во взаимоукрепляющих гражданственности, государственных и образовательных учреждениях, в индивидуальных правах, казалось, может распространяться сама собой. С 90-х гг. западные страны оформили этот телеологический и европоцентристский взгляд на политическое развитие в программы поддержки демократии, исходя из убежденности в собственном «системном превосходстве». Одним из основных элементов этих программ было усиление гражданского общества, в которое были инвестированы миллионы, однако возникли сложности: во-первых, спонсируемые НГО

исчезали при прекращении финансовой поддержки; во-вторых, проблемы, которыми занимались спонсируемые НГО, были актуальны для привлечения внимания западной общественности и доноров, но имели малое значение для местных сообществ и незначительные последствия для политики на национальном уровне. Потому такие НГО оказались неэффективны в создании диалога между обществом и властями, не способны формировать демократическую политическую культуру и были исключены из процесса принятия решений. Доноры этих программ пренебрегали социальной, экономической и культурной сложностью Центральной Азии, в которой разные ценности и нормы — советское наследие, регионализм, клиентелизм и племенные связи — сосуществовали и обеспечивали местную версию гражданского взаимодействия, основанного на традициях взаимопомощи («ашар») и влияния на местные власти.

Осознавая эти проблемы, с конца 90-х гг. западные доноры вводят новое понятие «поддержки сообществ» (community development) через участие в деятельности местных акторов, а с 2007 г. принимаются «Стратегия нового партнерства с Центральной Азией» (750 млн евро), «Региональная стратегия помощи ЕС Центральной Азии с 2007 по 2013 г.» и другие программы, например, тематическая программа «Негосударственные акторы и местные власти в развитии», начатая в 2006 г. и продолженная в программе «Негосударственные акторы и местные власти в развитии. Стратегия на 2011–2013 гг.», которые ставят в центр понимание развития демократии снизу и подчеркивают, что вопросы борьбы с терроризмом и наркотрафиком, нелегальной миграцией и энергетической безопасности ЕС могут быть лучше решены, если гражданское общество и демократический процесс, верховенство права и справедливый суд, а также эффективное управление (good governance) и общественно ориентированная госслужба (public service) в странах Центральной Азии будут на соответствующем уровне. Все эти документы опираются на двусторонние соглашения и партнерские договоры, однако следует упомянуть, что Regulation (EC) № 1889/2006 закрепляет формы поддержки демократии вне и помимо согласия правительств или органов власти третьих стран, а главным контрагентом выступает гражданское общество, понятое максимально широко, как «все типы общественной деятельности индивидов или групп, независимых от государства». С целью повышения доверия к НГО, увеличения их публичной представленности и влияния предполагается создание сетей гражданского общества и координация их деятельности с институтами ЕС посредством синергии и институционализированного диалога.

Из анализа программных и стратегических документов становится ясно, что, во-первых, официальные документы ЕС избегают четкой формулировки того, что понимается под «демократией», а предпринимаемые шаги выходят далеко за пределы электорального процесса. Демократия включена в ряд понятий «права человека», «эффективное управление», «верховенство закона», но никогда не рассматривается отдельно. Демократия представлена одной из конституирующих ценностей, на которых построен ЕС, и как часть политической культуры «цивилизованного мира», принадлежность к которой страны

Центральной Азии заявили, подписав соответствующие декларации и соглашения. ЕС считает свою миссию «цивилизующей», в чем проявляется европоцентризм, несмотря на смягчающие заявления о «партнерстве», «сотрудничестве» и «обмене опытом».

Во-вторых, новая стратегия ЕС по поддержке демократии является «инклюзивной»: программы и решения должны быть определены в сотрудничестве и согласованы с местными властями, а также должны быть направлены на нужды конкретной страны. Планируется поддерживать уже имеющиеся местные инициативы и устойчивые группы, тем самым способствуя диверсификации гражданского общества — как либеральным, так и общинным его формам, однако конкретные вопросы о том, кто и на каких условиях сможет получить доступ к финансам ЕС, прояснены недостаточно.

В-третьих, новая стратегия ЕС по поддержке демократии является «рефлексивной», т. е. предполагает мониторинг и независимую оценку результатов, реализацию целевых проектов (*ad hoc initiatives*), возможность корректировать работу и реагировать на непредусмотренные факторы, возникающие в местном политическом контексте.

Таким образом, можно заключить, что новая стратегия ЕС по поддержке демократии в странах Центральной Азии становится менее европоцентричной и телеологичной, но ее эффективность можно будет оценить лишь в будущем.

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СЕМАНТИКА ПОЗВОЛЕННОГО: ШЕРОХОВАТОСТИ ДЕОНТИЧЕСКОГО ЛАНДШАФТА*

В статье стандартная семантика деонтической логики, выполненная на основе динамической логики высказываний, дополняется «строгими» операторами. Обсуждаются понятия «степень ответственности», «нормативная индифферентность», «деонтическая полнота», «позволенные риски действия и бездействия».

Ключевые слова: деонтическая логика, динамическая логика высказываний, логическая семантика, нормативные операторы, санкция, степень ответственности.

Данный текст является развитием, дополнением и уточнением ранее опубликованной статьи [9]; он, в отличие от предыдущих наших исследований [10, 11], опирается исключительно на редукцию деонтической логики к динамической логике высказываний, подробно рассматривает группу операторов, выражающих нормативное безразличие (индифферентность), анализирует сложные взаимоотношения двух групп операторов в «деонтическом универсу-

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